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Discussion about vulnerable individuals and communities spread from research ethics to 
consumer law and human rights. According to many theoreticians and practitioners, the 
framework of vulnerability allows formulating an alternative language to articulate prob- 
lems of inequality, power imbalances and social injustice. Building on this conceptualisa- 
tion, we try to understand the role and potentiality of the notion of vulnerable data subjects. 
The starting point for this reflection is wide-ranging development, deployment and use of 
data-driven technologies that may pose substantial risks to human rights, the rule of law 
and social justice. Implementation of such technologies can lead to discrimination system- 
atic marginalisation of different communities and the exploitation of people in particularly 
sensitive life situations. Considering those problems, we recognise the special role of per- 
sonal data protection and call for its vulnerability-aware interpretation. This article makes 
three contributions. First, we examine how the notion of vulnerability is conceptualised and 
used in the philosophy, human rights and European law. We then confront those findings 
with the presence and interpretation of vulnerability in data protection law and discourse. 
Second, we identify two problematic dichotomies that emerge from the theoretical and prac- 
tical application of this concept in data protection. Those dichotomies reflect the tensions 
within the definition and manifestation of vulnerability. To overcome limitations that arose 
from those two dichotomies we support the idea of layered vulnerability, which seems com- 
patible with the GDPR and the risk-based approach. Finally, we outline how the notion of 
vulnerability can influence the interpretation of particular provisions in the GDPR. In this 
process, we focus on issues of consent, Data Protection Impact Assessment, the role of Data 
Protection Authorities, and the participation of data subjects in the decision making about 
data processing. 
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i. Introduction 
or decades, experts in research ethics have assumed that 
ome research participants and communities are more likely 
o be mistreated, abused, exploited or harmed.2 Such groups 
eem to possess a level of vulnerability, which generates cer- 
ain obligations and responsibilities for researchers and over- 
ight entities. The principle of special treatment of “vulner- 
ble groups” was incorporated into various declarations and 
uidelines that regulate especially clinical research, like the 
elmont Report or the Declaration of Helsinki.3 Those docu- 
ents predominantly focus on the issue of consent and in- 
ormed participation, highlighting problems of autonomy and 
ntegrity. Nevertheless, some other interpretations add more 
laborated understanding of vulnerability and raise issues of 
ower imbalance and political and economic disadvantage.4 
n other words, the language of vulnerability in research ethics 
llows greater sensitivity and responsiveness to equity, dis- 
rimination and different socio-historical contexts. However,
he notion of vulnerability is also discussed in other fields.
rom human rights to political philosophy, the concept is seen 
s a framework that enables the articulation of broad issues 
hat fill into the category of social justice and uncover human 
xposure to harms, pain and suffering.5 
As it will be argued below, human vulnerability is also (to 
ome extent) present in the discussions about data protection,
rivacy and data-driven technologies. Calo, a prominent voice 
n this debate, argues that the rationale for privacy protec- 
ion is precisely addressing vulnerability of individuals.6 Put 
t differently, privacy and data protection regimes are man- 
festations of the idea that all individuals are vulnerable to 
he power imbalances created by data-driven technologies.2 Carol Levine et al., “The Limitations of ‘Vulnerability’ as a Pro- 
ection for Human Research Participants,” The American Journal 
f Bioethics 4, no. 3 (August 2004): 44–49, https://doi.org/10.1080/ 
5265160490497083 . 
3 Phoebe Friesen et al., “Rethinking the Belmont Report?,” The 
merican Journal of Bioethics 17, no. 7 (July 3, 2017): 15–21, https: 
/doi.org/10.1080/15265161.2017.1329482 . 
4 Dearbhail Bracken-Roche et al., “The Concept of ‘Vulnerability’ 
n Research Ethics: An in-Depth Analysis of Policies and Guide- 
ines,”Health Research Policy and Systems 15, no. 1 (December 2017): 
, https://doi.org/10.1186/s12961- 016- 0164- 6 . 
5 Lourdes Peroni and Alexandra Timmer, “Vulnerable Groups: 
he Promise of an Emerging Concept in European Human Rights 
onvention Law,” International Journal of Constitutional Law 11, no. 
 (October 1, 2013): 1056–85, https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/mot042 ; 
ebecca Hewer, “A Gossamer Consensus: Discourses of Vulner- 
bility in the Westminster Prostitution Policy Subsystem,” Social 
 Legal Studies 28, no. 2 (April 2019): 227–49, https://doi.org/10. 
177/0964663918758513 ; Isabelle Bartkowiak-Théron and Nicole L. 
squith, “Conceptual Divides and Practice Synergies in Law En- 
orcement and Public Health: Some Lessons from Policing Vulner- 
bility in Australia,” Policing and Society 27, no. 3 (April 3, 2017): 276–
8, https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2016.1216553 , Martha Albert- 
on Fineman, “The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the 
uman Condition,”Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 20 (2008): 23; Ju- 
ith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (Lon- 
on ; New York: Verso, 2004). 
6 Ryan Calo, “Privacy, Vulnerability, and Affordance,” DePaul L. 
ev. 66 (2017): 592–593. 
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cdditionally, different scholars explain how data-driven tech- 
ologies can lead to discrimination, social marginalisation or 
ffect human autonomy and dignity and exploit particular 
ommunities.7 Such controversial cases in the data-driven re- 
earch concern automated systems that identify sexual orien- 
ation,8 detect children anxiety and depression 9 or predict and 
revent suicide.10 Finally, the notion of vulnerability appears 
n the discussion about ethics and regulation of Artificial In- 
elligence. Here some of the guidelines and ethical policies call 
or the governance frameworks that recognise the situation of 
ulnerable groups such as women, persons with disabilities,
thnic minorities, children, and consumers.11 
It seems to us that the issue of human vulnerability should 
e an important topic in the data protection debate, consid- 
ring the new risks of individual exploitation in the algorith- 
ic environment. Involving vulnerability as a “heuristic tool”
ould emphasise existing inequalities between different data 
ubjects and specify in a more systematic and consolidated 
ay that the exercise of data rights is conditioned by many 
actors such as health, age, gender or social status. However,
he scholarly discussion about vulnerable data subjects is still 
argely underdeveloped. Accordingly, in this article, we try to 
nderstand and conceptualise how the notion of vulnerable 
ndividuals finds its way in the data protection debate. More 
recisely, when human vulnerability can influence the way we 
re interpreting data protection regimes. 
We are aware that it is not possible to address this com- 
lex topic in one article satisfactorily. Our modest goal here 
s to initiate a discussion about this topic and its problem- 
tic aspects, suggesting some first interpretative paths, while 
alling for further analysis and research. To do this, we first 
nvestigate the meaning of “vulnerable individuals”, look- 
ng in particular at the theoretical discussion about vulner- 
bility ( Section 2 ). Taking into account this background, in 
ection 3 we then review how data protection and the GDPR 
n particular address the position of vulnerable individuals.
uilding on these findings, we then try to understudy how 
he notion of vulnerability is present in other branches of EU 7 For example: Solon Barocas and Andrew D. Selbst, “Big Data’s 
isparate Impact,” California Law Review 671 (2016), https://papers. 
srn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract _ id=2477899 ; Frank Pasquale, 
he Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and In- 
ormation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015); Virginia Eu- 
anks, Automating Inequality: How High-Tech Tools Profile, Police, and 
unish the Poor (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2018); Ruha Benjamin, 
ace after Technology : Abolitionist Tools for the New Jim Code (Cam- 
ridge: Cambridge Polity Press, 2019). 
8 Yilun Wang and Michal Kosinski, “Deep Neural Networks Are 
ore Accurate than Humans at Detecting Sexual Orientation from 
acial Images.,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 114, no. 2 
2018): 246–57, https://doi.org/10.1037/pspa0000098 . 
9 Ellen McGinnis et al., “Giving Voice to Vulnerable Children: Ma- 
hine Learning Analysis of Speech Detects Anxiety and Depression 
n Early Childhood,” IEEE Journal of Biomedical and Health Informatics 
2019): 1–2, https://doi.org/10.1109/JBHI.2019.2913590 . 
10 Mason Marks, “Artificial Intelligence Based Suicide Prediction,”
ale J.L. & Tech. Special Issue, 21 (2019): 98. 
11 See for example: High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelli- 
ence, ‘Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI’ (European Commis- 
ion 2019), 11 < https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document. 
fm?doc _ id=58477 > . 
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16 Fineman, “The Vulnerable Subject,” 8; Butler, Precarious Life, 22–
24. 
17 Peroni and Timmer, “Vulnerable Groups,” 1058; Fineman, “The 
Vulnerable Subject,” 9. 
18 Martha Albertson Fineman, “Beyond Identities: The Limits of 
an Antidiscrimination Approach to Equality,”Boston University Law 
Review, 92, no. 6 (2012): 1750. 
19 For example: Hewer, “A Gossamer Consensus,” 227–49; Nicole secondary law ( Section 4 ). Acknowledging the limits of exist-
ing legislation and discussion, in Section 5 , we finally propose
a new vulnerability-aware interpretation of data protection
law. 
2. Theorising human vulnerability 
The discussion about vulnerability has always had a multi-
disciplinary character. It emerged in a variety of fields, like
political philosophy, gender studies, law, ethics and sociology.
Very often, scholars from those different fields entered into
dialogue with each other and adapted understanding of vul-
nerability developed in other areas (for example from politi-
cal theory to bioethics). Our goal here is to demonstrate some
seminal works that represent a variety of voices and at the
same time help in grasping the crux of this debate. Through-
out the whole article, we extensively refer to the legal liter-
ature on the problem of vulnerability. However, legal schol-
ars have not yet fully developed the original approach to the
notion of vulnerability. Most of them base their ideas on the
work of theoreticians, especially Martha Fineman, who writes
extensively about the relations between law, state and indi-
vidual vulnerability. Presentation of those different theoretical
approaches helps in placing the origins of this notion and its
implications for institutions, legal systems and communities.
Therefore, we found a theoretical introduction necessary for
developing a vulnerability-aware interpretation of data pro-
tection. 
Some early definitions and conceptualisation of vulner-
ability stressed its links to fragility, harms and the experi-
ence of being wounded, as its etymology suggests (‘vulnus’
in Latin means wound).12 The term served almost as a syn-
onym of dependency, helplessness, pain, violence and weak-
ness.13 As it was expressed by Goodin, “vulnerability implies
more than susceptibility to certain sorts of harm … it also
implies that the harm is not predetermined”.14 Accordingly,
vulnerability refers to the potentiality of harm, not to actual
harms occurred.15 The concept of vulnerability has also been
portrayed as a promising and alternative way to address injus-
tices present in modern societies. For many scholars, vulnera-
bility becomes a language to describe, e.g., social marginalisa-
tion, economic insecurity, precarious employment conditions
or violence caused by wars. Fineman and Butler express that
the concept has a great potential to challenge liberal individu-
alism and redefine some of the existing frames about injustice,12 Catriona Mackenzie, Wendy Rogers, and Susan Dodds, “Intro- 
duction: What Is Vulnerability, and Why Does It Matter for Moral 
Theory?,” in Vulnerability: new essays in ethics and feminist philoso- 
phy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 4–5, https://doi.org/ 
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199316649.003.0001 . 
13 There are scholars who criticise only negative association of 
vulnerability, see for example: Erinn C Gilson, The Ethics of Vulner- 
ability: A Feminist Analysis of Social Life and Practice (New York and 
London: Routledge, 2016) 7–8. 
14 Robert E. Goodin, Protecting the Vulnerable: A Reanalysis of Our 
Social Responsibilities (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 
112. 
15 Gilson, The Ethics of Vulnerability, 7–8. dependency or privilege.16 While the field engaged in under-
standing the nature of vulnerability and explored its associa-
tions and consequences for political practice, ethics, research
and law, the term is still deemed vague, complex and am-
biguous.17 However, some problematic dichotomies and un-
certainties affect the application of the vulnerability concept
in the institutional environment. 
One of these dichotomies is between the particular and
universal character of vulnerability. In more traditional ap-
proaches, vulnerability is a distinctive character of particular
weaker individuals and groups, based on specific situations or
socio-economic contexts.18 Typical examples of such groups
are racial minorities, asylum seekers, and people with disabil-
ities. It is a predominant way of using the notion of vulnera-
bility in more practical circumstances like research, social pol-
icy, or policing.19 This way of understanding vulnerability was,
however, accused of bringing stigmatising effects and harm-
ful regulation for minorities.20 For these reasons, some crit-
ical scholars reformulate the understanding of vulnerability
as a universal human condition, which can change in differ-
ent situations, different periods and also in spaces. The con-
cept is portrayed as an ontological category and a general fea-
ture of human existence and embodiment.21 However, some
critics accuse that the emphasis of the universal character
of vulnerability ignores structural violence, injustice and ex-
ploitation that are experienced by particular groups.22 On the
other hand, apologists of a universalised notion of vulnerabil-
ity show this can be a way to run away from failures of existing
diversity and equality policies and anti-discrimination laws.23 
Another area of disputes about vulnerability concerns the
organisational, legal and political responses to vulnerability. In
this sense, vulnerability has a normative feature that involves
specific actions, ethical judgments and institutional arrange-
ments. For Goodin, vulnerability implies a justification for wel-
fare state institutions that could help in addressing the lack of
essential goods and services (in this sense, it has a clear dis-
tributive character).24 In a similar tone, Fineman calls for re-L. Asquith, Isabelle Bartkowiak-Théron, and Karl A. Roberts, eds., 
Policing Encounters with Vulnerability. (Cham: Springer International 
Publishing: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). 
20 Alyson Cole, “All of Us Are Vulnerable, But Some Are More Vul- 
nerable than Others: The Political Ambiguity of Vulnerability Stud- 
ies, an Ambivalent Critique,”Critical Horizons 17, no. 2 (May 3, 2016): 
262, https://doi.org/10.1080/14409917.2016.1153896 . 
21 Fineman, “The Vulnerable Subject,” 23; Butler, Precarious Life, 
26-28; Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice : Disability, Nationality, 
Species Membership (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 2006), 221. 
22 Frank Rudy Cooper, “Always Already Suspect: Revising Vulner- 
ability Theory,”North Carolina Law Review 93 (2014): 43; Cole, “All of 
Us Are Vulnerable, But Some Are More Vulnerable than Others," 
260–77, 
23 Fineman, “The Vulnerable Subject,” 18. 
24 Goodin, Protecting the Vulnerable, 145. 
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pponsive institutions and state architecture that recognise hu- 
an vulnerability. She criticises existing systems of rights and 
aws that depend on the formal equality and embrace individ- 
alistic, self-sufficient and rationalist liberal subject. Fineman 
ffers a different approach for the legal system and suggests 
 central role for “vulnerable subjects” in order to give institu- 
ional responses to context-specific dependences and injus- 
ices.25 
Theorising in the field of bioethics, Rogers et al. explain 
hat social practices and institutions can offer mitigation 
trategies toward vulnerability and encourage resilience.26 
ommentators in the research ethics field also stress that 
here are two ways of conceptualising and addressing con- 
equences of vulnerability.27 The first approach focuses on 
he harms and the ways to eliminate them.28 The second 
pproach focuses on individuals’ ability to overcome their 
ulnerable position and empower them with various deci- 
ional and procedural safeguards. Put it differently, in one ap- 
roach the emphasis is put on damages (physical or psycho- 
ogical), while in the second on consent or participation in the 
ecision-making about the research process. 
Those two problems discussed at the theoretical level (ten- 
ion between universalistic and particular character of vulner- 
bility and questions about vulnerability manifestation and 
elated mitigation strategies) also have far-reaching conse- 
uences for the practical use of the vulnerability framework.
owever, some scholars have tried to conciliate these differ- 
nt views and to overcome dichotomies. One of them is Luna,
ho tried to reply to different criticalities through a new con- 
eption of vulnerability as layers . According to Luna, layers of 
ulnerability are not fixed attributes of specific individuals or 
roups but are features constructed by status, time and loca- 
ion. In this sense, the concept of layering provides an open- 
ng to a more intersectional approach and stresses its cumu- 
ative and transitory potential.29 As Luna indicates, it is true 
hat vulnerability is a universal condition of human beings,
ut it is also true that such condition of weakness may vary 
rom an individual to another, may have different degrees of 
everity and many different factors. 
We could summarise this universal-particular theory as 
ollows: all individuals are vulnerable (there should be no la- 
els on some groups), but some individuals have more layers 
f vulnerability than others. This is a consequence of differ- 
nt social contexts and relational balances.30 The intensity of 25 Fineman, “The Vulnerable Subject,” 23. 
26 Wendy Rogers, Catriona Mackenzie, and Susan Dodds, “Why 
ioethics Needs a Concept of Vulnerability,” International Journal of 
eminist Approaches to Bioethics 5, no. 2 (2012): 11–38, https://doi.org/ 
0.2979/intjfemappbio.5.2.11 . 
27 Doris Schroeder and Eugenijus Gefenas, "Vulnerability: Too 
ague and Too Broad?," Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 18, 
o. 2 (2009): 18, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0963180109090203 . 
28 Éloïse Gennet, Roberto Andorno, and Bernice Elger, “Does the 
ew EU Regulation on Clinical Trials Adequately Protect Vulnera- 
le Research Participants?,”Health Policy 119, no. 7 (July 2015): 925–
1, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2015.04.007 . 
29 Florencia Luna, “Elucidating the Concept of Vulnerability: Lay- 
rs Not Labels,” International Journal of Feminist Approaches to 
ioethics 2, no. 1 (2009): 121–39, https://doi.org/10.3138/ijfab.2.1.121 . 
30 Ibidem. 
p
b
t  
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p
s
e
o
v
b
9he legal protection of vulnerable individuals should be pro- 
ortional to the quantity and quality of layers of vulnerabil- 
ty.31 The identification and assessment of layers of vulnera- 
ility should be based on several criteria: an analysis of the 
rigins of vulnerability (that is, an analysis of the stimulus 
onditions including if some layers are “cascade vulnerabil- 
ty”, i.e. layers that have a cascade effect on other sources of 
ulnerability) and of its effects (that is, probability and inten- 
ity of harms).32 Lastly, Luna’s theory on layered vulnerabil- 
ty suggests that each vulnerability layer has its own mitiga- 
ion measures. The obligations originated by layers evaluation 
see above) should be: avoiding exacerbating layers, eradicat- 
ng layers and minimising layers of vulnerability through dif- 
erent strategies (protections, safeguards, empowerment).33 
In sum, the discussion about vulnerability is not singular 
nd can lead to different paradoxes and dichotomies. Among 
he strengths of this discourse is a search for a more progres- 
ive conceptualisation of justice that is deeply rooted in hu- 
an nature and different socio-historical contexts. Under this 
erspective, vulnerability may serve a ground for transforma- 
ions of ethics, policy and law. At the same time, the relative 
agueness and instability of this concept are its main weak- 
ess and create some serious challenges in its practical appli- 
ation. In this article, we argue that layered vulnerability can 
e one of the most suitable approaches to address those issues 
nd the best response to several criticisms. More precisely, we 
ill rely on the layers theory to understand vulnerability in 
he data protection field. 
. Situating vulnerable individuals in the data 
rotection field 
uilding on these different theories and ways of understand- 
ng human vulnerability, we will now look at the notion of vul- 
erability in the data protection discourse and in particular in 
he GDPR. So far, vulnerability per se has not been a significant 
rea of discussion among privacy and data protection schol- 
rs. However in our interpretation the notion plays a vital role 
n situating the position of the individual in the context of data 
rocessing. Nevertheless, at the same time we see that intro- 
uction of vulnerability in the data protection field may du- 
licate problematic dichotomies that we summarised in the 
revious section. 
The first dichotomy relates to the definition of vulnera- 
ility in the field of privacy and data protection: there is a 
ension between particularistic and universalistic approaches.
ccording to the universalistic approach, privacy and data 
rotection safeguard all individuals equally in digital eco- 
phere, because we are all equally exposed to violations. As 
xplained by Calo, knowledge and information confer power 
ver individuals and make them vulnerable.34 Therefore pri- 
acy and data rights play a protective function and create 31 Ibidem, 86–95. 
32 Ibidem 92 and 93. 
33 Florencia Luna, “Identifying and Evaluating Layers of Vulnera- 
ility – a Way Forward,” Developing World Bioethics 19, no. 2 (2019): 
3, https://doi.org/10.1111/dewb.12206 . 
34 Calo, "Privacy, Vulnerability, and Affordance," 594. 
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 barriers for discovering, rendering and exploiting those vul-
nerabilities. However, in reality, the position of different data
subjects is very diverse: they have different understandings,
different levels of awareness, decisional capacity, propensity
to disclose their data, and weakness. However, in the data
protection discourse, the notion of data subject has generally
been unique and rigid,35 and there is no clarity about whether
such unique notion refers to an average data subject (like in
the consumer field) or not.36 Scholars articulate how different
situations of specific groups and individuals shape their capa-
bilities, enjoyment and expectations about privacy and data
protection. A typical example here is the situation of children . 
Put it simply, children have limited capacity to understand
the complexity of data-driven architecture, have less expe-
rience, less awareness of risks and rights and may be eas-
ily manipulated. For those reasons, processing data of mi-
nors is shaped by specific rules in data protection regimes
and is also subject to numerous studies.37 Nevertheless, the
inequality between data subjects goes beyond the issue of
age. In other contexts, scholars show that intrusion of privacy
can be marked by social differences – race, ethnicity, class,
sexual orientation, migration status or gender.38 For exam-
ple, those conditions very often act as a justification for par-
ticularly onerous forms of surveillance. Furthermore, Gilman
argues that privacy laws are not always protecting those in
less advantaged positions, mirroring existing inequalities and
power dynamics.39 Similarly, analysing the European context,
Blume recognises that numerous factors like age, mental ca-
pacity, literacy or gender can affect the enjoyment and execu-
tion of individual data rights.40 
In addition, we observe a distinction between vulnerability
risks related to the data processing and vulnerability risks re-
lated to the outcomes of such data processing. Under the first
perspective, vulnerability can emerge, for example, as the lim-
ited capability to provide free consent for collection of per-
sonal data, to understand information about data processing
or to exercise data protection rights adequately. Those limi-35 Peter Blume, “The Data Subject,” European Data Protection Law 
Review 1, no. 4 (2015): 259, https://doi.org/10.21552/EDPL/2015/4/4 . 
36 Gloria González Fuster, “How Uninformed Is the Average Data 
Subject? A Quest for Benchmarks in EU Personal Data Protection,”
IDP Revista de Internet, Derecho y Política 19 (November 2014): 92–104, 
https://doi.org/10.7238/idp.v0i19.2424 . 
37 For example recent study by Mariya Stoilova et al. show differ- 
ent expectations and strategies employ to protect their privacy: 
Mariya Stoilova, Sonia Livingstone, and Rishita Nandagiri, “Chil- 
dren’s Data and Privacy Online” (London: London School of Eco- 
nomics and Political Science, 2019). 
38 Mary Madden et al., “Privacy, Poverty and Big Data: A Matrix of 
Vulnerabilities for Poor Americans,”Washington University Law Re- 
view 95, no. 1 (2017); Khiara M. Bridges, The Poverty of Privacy Rights 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2017) 1–35; John Gilliom, Over- 
seers of the Poor: Surveillance, Resistance and the Limits of Privacy 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 1–16. 
39 Michele E. Gilman, “The Class Differential in Privacy Law,”
Brooklyn Law Review 77, no. 4 (2012): 1394; Michele E. Gilman and Re- 
becca Green, “The Surveillance Gap: The Harms of Extreme Privacy 
and Data Marginalization,”NYU Review of Law and Social Change 42 
(2018): 296–299. 
40 Blume, “The Data Subject,” 258. tations may result from various factors like age, disability or
socio-economic position. 
Under the second perspective, vulnerability in the data pro-
tection framework emerges in the form of harms to which in-
dividuals are exposed. As explained by commentators, data-
driven systems can serve as tools of potential discrimina-
tion, manipulation or may lead to physical and psychologi-
cal harms. Different examples from law enforcement, welfare,
banking or housing are showing that those technologies can
reinforce social inequalities and lead to discrimination in the
access to services and goods.41 This discussion focuses very
often on harmful biases embedded in models, training data
and definitional problems.42 Similarly, some controversial ex-
amples of data-driven research are accused of reproducing
inflammatory stereotypes and creating life-threatening situ-
ations for specific marginalised communities.43 
In sum, there are two major dichotomies in human vul-
nerability theories that we can find relevant also in the data
protection discourse. One dichotomy concerns the definition
of vulnerable subjects and is between universality (everyone is
equally vulnerable) and particularity (some subjects are more
vulnerable than others). The other dichotomy regards mani-
festations of vulnerability: vulnerability may arise within the
data processing (decisional vulnerability risks related to data
collection, consent provision, and inappropriate exercise of
data protection rights) or as a consequence to the outcomes of
the processing (some data processing may generate discrimi-
nation, manipulation or secondary harms such as physical or
psychological harms). 
Therefore, situating vulnerability in the data protection
framework is a problematic task. If we affirm that all data sub-
jects are universally vulnerable, we may ignore significant dif-
ferences among them, which may weaken the protection of
individuals in an already disadvantaged position. At the same41 Julia Angwin and Jeff Larson, “Bias in Criminal Risk Scores is 
Mathematically Inevitable, Researchers Say,” ProPublica , Decem- 
ber 2016, https://www.propublica.org/article/bias- in- criminal- 
risk- scores- is- mathematically- inevitable- researchers-say ; Vir- 
ginia Eubanks, Automating Inequality, 1–13; Pasquale, The Black 
Box Society, 1–18; Lilian Edwards and Michael Veale, “Slave to the 
Algorithm? Why a ‘right to an Explanation’ Is Probably Not the 
Remedy You Are Looking For,” Duke Law & Technology Review 16, 
no. 1 (2017): 27–32, https://doi.org/10.31228/osf.io/97upg. 
42 For example Solon Barocas, “Data Mining and the Discourse 
on Discrimination,” in Proceedings of the Data Ethics Workshop, Con- 
ference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (KDD) (New York, 
2014), 4, http://www.cs.yale.edu/homes/jf/Barocas-Taxonomy.pdf; 
Danielle Keats Citron, “Promoting Innovation While Preventing 
Discrimination: Policy Goals for the Scored Society,”Wash. L. Rev. 89 
(2014): 1413; Oscar H. Gandy, “It’s Discrimination, Stupid!,” in Resist- 
ing the Virtual Life: The Culture and Politics of Information , ed. James 
Brook (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1995), 35–47; Tal Zarsky, 
“Understanding Discrimination in the Scored Society,”Washington 
Law Review 89, no. 4 (2014): 1375–1412, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract _ id=2550248 . 
43 Jacob Metcalf, “‘The Study Has Been Approved by the IRB’: 
Gayface AI, Research Hype and the Pervasive Data Ethics 
Gap,” Medium (blog), 2017, https://medium.com/pervade-team/ 
the- study- has- been- approved- by- the- irb- gayface- ai- research- 
hype- and- the- pervasive- data- ethics- ed76171b882c . 
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sime, more specific protection rules and safeguards can lead to 
ragmentation of the already complicated legal regime. Also,
hile focusing on harms, the discussion could easily end up 
ith a never-ending list of damages, which are not providing 
ny additional value. On the other hand, concentrating on pro- 
edural safeguards can neglect the importance of actual dam- 
ges, suffer and pain that some individuals may experience 
s a result of the use of particular data-driven technologies.
hose problems may lead to the conclusions that vulnerabil- 
ty in the data protection framework can be a dead end, but –
s we argue below – there is at least one theory that could 
elp develop the notion of data subjects’ vulnerability in a 
onstructive way. We refer to Luna’s theory of layered vulner- 
bility (see below). 
.1. Data subjects’ vulnerability in the General Data 
rotection Regulation 
n order to better understand what the notion of individual 
ulnerability in the GDPR is and why a layered approach to 
ulnerability might be a constructive step further, we will now 
nalyse the wording of the GDPR and the interpretations of- 
ered by the Article 29 Working Party (WP29) and the European 
ata Protection Board (EDPB). As we affirmed in the previous 
ection, when dealing with the notion of vulnerable subjects 
here are two dichotomies to address: definition (universalism 
ersus particularism) and manifestations (vulnerability within 
he data processing versus vulnerability to the outcomes of the 
rocessing). 
The first dichotomy to consider regards the definition: 
hat is the status of a vulnerable person in the GDPR and 
ow could we eventually solve the dichotomy between uni- 
ersal and particular vulnerability interpreting the wording 
f the GDPR? Actually, the GDPR does not contain an explicit 
efinition of vulnerable data subjects. There is just one slight 
eference in recital 75 about relevant risks to consider when 
erforming a Data Protection Impact Assessment: “where per- 
onal data of vulnerable natural persons, in particular of chil- 
ren , are processed”. “In particular” means that children are 
ulnerable subjects, but that also other data subjects might 
e considered vulnerable. The situation of children is specif- 
cally addressed in the GDPR – through requirements for 
onsent for information society services (Article 8) and spe- 
ific transparency duties towards children (Article 12(1).44 44 About the topic of children data protection see, in general, 
ina Jasmontaite and Paul de Hert, “The EU, Children under 13 
ears, and Parental Consent: A Human Rights Analysis of a New, 
ge-Based Bright-Line for the Protection of Children on the Inter- 
et,” International Data Privacy Law 5 (2014): 20–33, https://doi.org/ 
0.1093/idpl/ipu029 ; Alessandro Mantelero, “Children Online and 
he Future EU Data Protection Framework: Empirical Evidences 
nd Legal Analysis,” Int. J. Technology Policy and Law 2 (2016): 169–
1, https://doi.org/10.1504/IJTPL.2016.077189 ; Eva Lievens and Va- 
erie Verdoodt, “Looking for Needles in a Haystack: Key Issues 
ffecting Children’s Rights in the General Data Protection Reg- 
lation,” Computer Law & Security Review 34, no. 2 (2018): 269–78, 
ttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.clsr.2017.09.007 ; S. van der Hof, “I Agree... 
r Do I? A Rights-Based Analysis of the Law on Children’s Con- 
ent in the Digital World,” Wisconsin International Law Journal 34, 
o. 2 (2017): 409–45; van der Hof Simone and Eva Lievens, “The Im- 
b
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Wonsidering that children are specifically vulnerable data sub- 
ects, one may conclude that the GDPR approach to vulnera- 
ility is particular and not universal: just some groups (namely,
hildren) are vulnerable. However, the definition of the data 
ubject – as already affirmed – is universal and unique 45 and 
hildren are just one group at high risk, but other groups can 
sually have similar risks (for example: elderly, mentally ill 
ersons). 
Importantly, the GDPR offers at recital 38 a justification 
or this special protection for children: “children merit spe- 
ific protection with regard to their personal data, as they may 
e less aware of the risks, consequences and safeguards con- 
erned and their rights in relation to the processing of per- 
onal data”. In other words, a lack of awareness and under- 
tanding about consequences and legal rights (what we can 
all decisional vulnerability) justifies the particular protection 
or children. The idea of decisional vulnerability of children 
s then reaffirmed at recital 65 that emphasises the prob- 
em of consent in the context of erasing personal data. Ad- 
itionally, recital 58 reveals that the reason for protection is 
ainly based on children’s reduced capacity of understand- 
ng. However, one may wonder whether some of the rationales 
or the protection of children in the data protection frame- 
ork can be considered – by analogy – also for other vulner- 
ble adults. Although the answer is not clear, WP29 has pro- 
ided some guidance on this matter and it remarked in sev- 
ral opinions that vulnerability could not be limited only to 
hildren. 
In particular, WP29 argues that the key factor in identify- 
ng individual vulnerability is a power imbalance between the 
ata subject and the data controller. Power imbalance means 
hat individuals may be “unable to easily consent to, or op- 
ose, the processing of their data, or exercise their rights”.
P29 tries to enlist some vulnerable data subjects: children,
ince “they can be considered as not able to knowingly and 
houghtfully oppose or consent to the processing of their 
ata”; employees; more vulnerable segments of the popula- 
ion requiring special protection (“mentally ill persons, asy- 
um seekers, or the elderly, patients, etc.”), and “in any case 
here an imbalance in the relationship between the position 
f the data subject and the controller can be identified”.46 Here 
he link between power imbalance and vulnerability of the data 
ubjects is clear: when the data controllers are in a position of 
ignificant power imbalance (in particular in terms of possi- 
le impacts on fundamental rights and freedoms, significant 
nformation asymmetry based on predictive analytics, etc.) to- 
ards the data subject, the latter should be considered vulner- 
ble. ortance of Privacy by Design and Data Protection Impact Assess- 
ents in Strengthening Protection of Children’s Personal Data Un- 
er the GDPR,” Communications Law 23 (2018), https://papers.ssrn. 
om/abstract=3107660 . 
45 See Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of 
ersonal data, WP136, 21–22. 
46 Article 29 Working Party, Guidelines on Data Protection Impact 
ssessment (DPIA) and determining whether processing is “likely 
o result in a high risk” for the purposes of Regulation 2016/679, 
P 248 rev.01, 10. 
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 Similar wording can be found in the WP29 Opinion on legit-
imate interests.47 When data controllers perform the balanc-
ing test that is required if they want to process personal data
on the basis of legitimate interests (Article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR),
they need to consider the nature and source of the legitimate
interest, if there are additional safeguards and what is the im-
pact on the data subject, considering in particular “the status
of the data controller and data subject, including the balance of
power between the data subject and the data controller , or whether
the data subject is a child or otherwise belongs to a more vulner-
able segment of the population .”48 Again, the idea of vulnerabil-
ity is linked to power imbalance. In particular, vulnerability is
considered as a contextual notion: “the question whether the
data subject is an employee, a student, a patient, or whether
there is otherwise an imbalance in the relationship between
the position of the data subject and the controller must cer-
tainly be also relevant. It is important to assess the effect of ac-
tual processing on particular individuals .”49 Similar views were ar-
ticulated in the WP29 Guidelines on Purpose Limitation under
the Data Protection Directive and WP29 Guidelines on Trans-
parency.50 
WP29 has also expanded the notion of vulnerable groups
beyond children, when addressing the meaning of “significant
effects” under article 22, GDPR. In that opinion, WP29 clarifies
that when assessing the effects of automated decisions on in-
dividuals, one factor to be considered is whether the controller
used “knowledge of the vulnerabilities of the data subjects tar-
geted”.51 The notion of vulnerability is very much related to
adverse impacts: “processing that might have little impact on
individuals generally may in fact have a significant effect for
certain groups of society, such as minority groups or vulnerable
adults ”.52 
As regards the other dichotomy, i.e. the manifestation of
vulnerability within the data processing or as an outcome of
the data processing, it seems that WP29 addresses both as-
pects. The analysis of children vulnerability focuses predom-
inantly on the processing side (i.e. decisional vulnerability re-
lated to the collection of data, to the provision of consent and
to the exercise of data subject rights).53 However, in the Guide-
lines on Data Protection Impact Assessment, the vulnerability
of data subjects is considered one of the nine indexes for iden-47 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 06/2014 on the "Notion of le- 
gitimate interests of the data controller under Article 7 of Directive 
95/46/EC”. 
48 Ibidem, 51. 
49 Ibidem, 41. Emphasis added. 
50 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 03/2013 on purpose limita- 
tion, WP 203, 32; Article 29 Working Party, Guidelines on Trans- 
parency under Regulation 2016/679" clarifying requirements of the 
EU GDPR, WP 260, 9. 
51 Article 29 Working Party, Guidelines on Automated individ- 
ual decision-making and Profiling for the purposes of Regulation 
2016/679, WP 251 rev.01, 22. 
52 Ibidem, 22. 
53 Article 29 Working Party, Guidelines on Data Protection Impact 
Assessment (DPIA) and determining whether processing is “likely 
to result in a high risk” for the purposes of Regulation 2016/679, 
WP 248 rev.01, 10. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 tifying cases of high risks of data processing under Article 35
GDPR.54 
Recital 75 suggests the reason why vulnerable data sub-
jects (in general, not only children) require special atten-
tion when determining whether a data processing is of high
risk for rights and freedoms of natural persons. Those risks
“may result from personal data processing which could lead
to physical, material or non-material damage, in particular
(…) where personal data of vulnerable natural persons, in par-
ticular of children, are processed”.55 In other words, some sub-
jects should be protected not only because of their limited ca-
pacity to understand and give consent, but from higher risks
of material or non-material damages. The examples might be
several: some subjects are more at risk of discrimination dur-
ing an automated data processing (in particular in case of, e.g.,
automated profiling); other subjects might be more easily im-
paired in their freedom of thought when their data are pro-
cessed for direct marketing; other subjects might have bigger
physical or psychological damages in case of a data breach,
etc. Children are a category that is both decisionally vulnera-
ble and is exposed to the higher risks of harms. However, we
can easily imagine categories of data subjects who have no re-
duced decisional capacity but can suffer from higher risks of
damages from a data processing. 
In sum, we preliminarily analysed the definition of vulner-
able subjects and the manifestations of vulnerability in the
GDPR. In both these areas, we observe dichotomies: as regards
the definition of vulnerable individuals, there is a tension be-
tween a universal notion of vulnerability (since there is no ref-
erence to vulnerable groups and just an open reference to vul-
nerability in recital 75) and a particular one (just children are
mentioned as an example and there are specific safeguards
only for children). However, it seems that the GDPR is open
to both approaches: particularism and universalism. As we
will argue in the final sections, the solution to this apparent
contradiction is in the notion of “risk”, which is very close to
Luna’s notion of “layers” of vulnerability. The risk-based ap-
proach in the GDPR suggests a layered analysis of vulnerabil-
ity, i.e. everyone is potentially vulnerable, but at different lev-
els and in different contexts. 
As regards the manifestation problem, vulnerability risks
within the data processing itself (i.e. decisional vulnerability
related to data collection and the lack of capability to exercise
data rights) are the declared rationale for protecting the only
explicit vulnerable category (i.e. children). However, recital 75
and WP29 emphasises more on vulnerability risks arising as
an outcome of the data processing. 
In order to better solve these apparent contradictions,
the following section will investigate the understanding and
scope of individual vulnerability in the international human
rights law and the EU law. To do that, we will look both at
the European Convention on Human Rights (and the relevant
caselaw of the ECtHR) regarding vulnerable individuals and
at the EU law to understand if we can profit from more de-
veloped notions of vulnerability. In particular, we will observe
whether the approach is to propose a specific list of vulner-54 Ibid. 
55 See Recital 75, GDPR. 
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sble groups or assuming an open clause for a universal no- 
ion of vulnerability. Also, we will see whether vulnerability 
anifestations are focussed more on decisional vulnerability 
r to risks of subsequent harms. 
. The broader perspective: vulnerability in 
he EU law 
.1. Vulnerability and human rights: the rise of the 
oncept of vulnerable persons in the ECtHR jurisprudence 
he notion of vulnerability plays a significant role in the hu- 
an rights discussion. Although the concept of vulnerabil- 
ty is neither present in the European Convention on Hu- 
an Rights nor the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, schol- 
rs and human rights institutions and organisations refer 
o it as an imperative that entails special protection of so- 
ially marginalised groups like women, people with disabili- 
ies, children, or ethnical minorities.56 The ECtHR recognises 
ulnerable situations of particular groups, but it never em- 
loyed the notion of vulnerability in the field of private life,
rivacy or data protection (Article 8 ECHR). 
The Court has firstly addressed the idea of vulnerable per- 
ons in 1981, referring to children. In Dudgeons v. UK 57 the 
ourt referred to “the moral interests and welfare of certain 
ndividuals or classes of individuals who are in need of special 
rotection for reasons such as lack of maturity, mental disability 
r state of dependence ”.58 
In this judgment, the Court adopted the idea of inherent 
ulnerability based on ( age as an index of) weakness, inexpe- 
ience and dependence.59 In particular, the category of chil- 
ren vulnerability qualifies as intrinsically gradual and tem- 
oral. However, the Court tends to assume a hybrid definition 
f vulnerability, both universal and particular , as the wording 
specially vulnerable” reveals: all individuals are potentially 
ulnerable, but some are especially vulnerable.60 
In later judgments, the ECtHR extended the notion of vul- 
erability to politically and socially disadvantaged groups. For 
xample, in Chapman v. The United Kingdom the Court stated 
hat “the vulnerable position of Gypsies as a minority means 
hat some special consideration should be given to their needs 
nd their different lifestyle both in the relevant regulatory 
lanning framework and in reaching decisions in particular 
ases”.61 The category of vulnerable groups was also expanded 
o asylum seekers, people living with HIV and individual fac- 56 See in general Francesca Ippolito and Sara Iglesias Sánchez 
Ed.), Protecting Vulnerable Groups: The European Human Rights Frame- 
ork (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015); See also, in the US discourse 
ryan S. Turner, Vulnerability and Human Rights (University Park: 
ennsylvania State University Press, 2006). 
57 Dudgeons v. UK , Application no. 7525/76, (22 October 1981). 
58 Ibidem, §47. Emphasis added. 
59 Francesca Ippolito, “(De)Constructing Children’s Vulnerability 
nder European Law,” in Protecting Vulnerable Groups , 23–48. 
60 Peroni and Timmer, “Vulnerable Groups,” 1056–85. 
61 Chapman v. The United Kingdom, Application no. 27238/95 , (18 
anuary 2001), §95. 
W
m  
u
2
ung social disadvantage and material deprivation.62 The partly 
issenting opinion of Judge Salò has critically developed the 
efinition of vulnerable persons under the ECtHR jurispru- 
ence. He originally observes that the concept of vulnerabil- 
ty is not a monolith, there are different grades of vulnerabil- 
ty based on different situations.63 Those different cases show 
lso that the Court perceives vulnerability as relational, harm- 
ased and depending on the situation of particular communi- 
ies, ethical groups or life situations.64 
The reference to vulnerability in the ECtHR jurisprudence 
lso has three significant legal consequences.65 Firstly, vulner- 
bility requires establishing positive obligations toward disad- 
antaged groups and providing tailored measures that recog- 
ise their particular needs and situations. For example, in 
hapman case the Court called British authorities to acknowl- 
dge the situation of Roma in the policymaking process.66 In 
ther cases, the Court obliged governments to provide spe- 
ial financial assistance to asylum seekers or shelter to people 
ho were evicted by force.67 
Secondly, vulnerability of particular groups can also influ- 
nce the weight of harm in the proportionality test, amplifying 
he consequences and scope of harms. As stressed in the Yor- 
anova case: “the applicants’ specificity as a social group and 
heir needs must be one of the relevant factors in the propor- 
ionality assessment that the national authorities are under a 
uty to undertake”.68 
The third consequence is related to the margin of appre- 
iation. As it was explicitly mentioned in the Kiyutin v. Russia 
ase, in the situation of vulnerable groups: “State’s margin of 
ppreciation is substantially narrower, and it must have very 
eighty reasons for the restrictions in question”.69 
Vulnerability is a central and vital aspect of human rights 
egal practice. It helps understand the particularity of certain 
isadvantaged groups and understand that economic, histor- 
cal and social conditions play an important role in the en- 
oyment of rights. Therefore, the recognition of vulnerability 
llows to acknowledge problems of discrimination, procedu- 
al safeguards, distributional policies or political participation.
uch approach links vulnerability in the human rights dis- 
ourse to the broader problems of social justice. This contrasts 
ith the conceptualisation of vulnerability in other fields (i.e.
esearch ethics) that focus predominantly on consent and 
ther decisional aspects. 
.2. The rise of vulnerable individuals in the EU 
econdary law: an overview 
hile vulnerability emerges somehow “naturally” in the hu- 
an rights field, other fields of law refer to it as well. Although62 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece , Application no. 30696/09, (21 Jan- 
ary 2011); Kiyutin v. Russia , Application no. 2700/10, (10 March 
011); Yordanova v. Bulgaria , Application no. 25446/06, (5 June 2012). 
63 Francesca Ippolito, “(De)Constructing Children’s Vulnerability 
nder European Law.”, 23–27. 
64 Peroni and Timmer, “Vulnerable Groups,” 1063–64. 
66 Ibidem, 1076–83. 
65 Chapman v. The United Kingdom, §96. 
67 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, §249; Yordanova v. Bulgaria, §130. 
68 Yordanova v. Bulgaria, §130. 
69 Kiyutin v. Russia, 2011, §63. 
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Table 1 – Examples of vulnerable groups in EU law. 
Field of law Vulnerable groups 
Employment – “pregnant workers, workers who have 
recently given birth or who are 
breastfeeding”77 
“women, migrants and domestic workers, 
some undeclared workers”78 
Biomedical 
research 
– “prisoners and cognitively impaired 
patients”79 
– “frail or older people, people suffering from 
multiple chronic conditions, and people 
affected by mental health disorders”80 
Public health – “pregnant women and children”81 
Migration – “children and unaccompanied minors”82 
Social 
assistance 
– “persons with disabilities, refugees and 
displaced persons”83 
Regulation of 
road traffic 
– “blind, visually impaired and aurally 
challenged pedestrians, cyclists and 
84 
December 2006 concerning misleading and comparative advertis- 
ing (codified version)” that has no more reference to vulnerable 
persons. 
77 Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduc- 
tion of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and 
health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have re- 
cently given birth or are breastfeeding (tenth individual Directive 
within the meaning of Article 16 (1) of Directive 89/391/EEC). 
78 Directive 2014/54/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 April 2014 on measures facilitating the exercise of 
rights conferred on workers in the context of freedom of move- 
ment for workers, recital 5 refers to workers as vulnerable persons. 
79 Council Decision of 15 December 1994 adopting a specific pro- 
gramme of research and technological development, including 
demonstration, in the field of biomedicine and health (1994 to 
1998), 94/913/EC, Annex I, § 7. 
80 Regulation (EU) No 536/2014 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 16 April 2014 on clinical trials on medicinal products 
for human use. 
81 Decision No. 646/96/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 29 March 1996 adopting an action plan to combat cancer 
within the framework for action in the field of public health (1996 neither the Charter of Fundamental Rights nor the Treaty of
the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the
EU contains a single reference to vulnerable persons, special
considerations of vulnerable individuals can be found in sev-
eral pieces of EU legislation. 
One of the first legal mentions of personal vulnerability
was in 1983 Council Decision on the European Social Fund.70
The preamble refers to “categories of persons who are partic-
ularly vulnerable on the labour market (in particular women,
the handicapped and migrants)”. The following year, two other
Council acts referred to vulnerable persons, always in the
field of the market (in particular disabled workers).71 In 1990
the concept of vulnerability was then used in the even more
context-dependent case of road users. It is the case of Coun-
cil Directive on Civil Liability insurances,72 whose preamble
referred to motor vehicle passengers as “vulnerable category of
potential victims”. However, for many years vulnerable groups
were mentioned only in the preambles of legal texts. For the
first time, in 1994, the notion of vulnerability was included
in one article of a European Directive: it is the case of young
workers.73 
Over the years, the notion of vulnerability slowly appeared
in different socio-legal contexts to describe a variety of groups,
as illustrated in Table 1 . Examples of legal instruments that
refer to vulnerability of particular groups range from employ-
ment, biomedical research, migration policy, to social assis-
tance. Importantly, those instruments do not always describe
those vulnerable groups in detail. Sometimes they even refer
to the universal and inherent concept of vulnerability as in
the first medical device directive (“the vulnerability of human
body”).74 
Two fields of EU law, namely consumer protection law and
the regulation on clinical trials, require some more attention,
as they generated meaningful theoretical and practical dis-
cussions about the notion of vulnerability that could also be
imported in the data protection discourse. 
4.2.1. Vulnerable consumers in the EU law 
The first explicit application of the notion of vulnerability in
the consumer field can be found in the Directive 97/55/EC on
misleading advertising.75 Recital 22 allowed Member States
to limit comparative advertising, in particular for advertis-
ing which targeted vulnerable consumer groups .76 As we observe70 Council Decision of 17 October 1983 on the tasks of the Euro- 
pean Social Fund, 83/516/EEC. 
71 Council resolution of 27 February 1984 on a second programme 
of action of the European Communities on safety and health at 
work, 84/C 67/02. 
72 Third Council Directive 90/232/EEC of 14 May 1990 on the ap- 
proximation of the laws of the Member States relating to insurance 
against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles. 
73 Council Directive 94/33/EC of 22 June 1994 on the protection of 
young people at work. 
74 Council Directive 93/42/EEC of 14 June 1993 concerning medical 
devices. 
75 Directive 97/55/EC of European Parliament and of the Council 
of 6 October 1997 amending Directive 84/450/EEC concerning mis- 
leading advertising so as to include comparative advertising. 
76 Surprisingly, this directive has been repealed by “Directive 
2006/114/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 children”
Consumer 
rights 
– “elderly and other vulnerable users”85 
– “vulnerable households, including those 
affected by energy poverty”86 to 2000). 
82 Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum 
standards for the qualification and status of third country nation- 
als or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise 
need international protection and the content of the protection 
granted, now repealed by Directive 2011/95/EU, Article 20(3). 
83 Regulation (EU) No 231/2014 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing an Instrument for Pre- 
accession Assistance (IPA II). 
84 Regulation (EU) No 540/2014 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 16 April 2014 on the sound level of motor vehi- 
cles and of replacement silencing systems, and amending Direc- 
tive 2007/46/EC and repealing Directive 70/157/EC. 
85 Regulation (EU) 2015/751 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 29 April 2015 on interchange fees for card-based pay- 
ment transactions. 
86 Directive (EU) 2018/2002 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 11 December 2018 amending Directive 2012/27/EU on 
energy efficiency. 
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H
vin Table 1 , consumer law took into account consumer vulner- 
bility also in specific sectors, like energy or e-payments. 
In more general terms, the Directive 2005/29/EC, the so- 
alled Unfair Commercial Practice Directive (UCPD), refers in 
rticle 5(3) to vulnerable groups of consumers as “people par- 
icularly vulnerable to the practice or the underlying product 
ecause of their mental or physical infirmity, age or credulity”.
he recognition of those vulnerable consumers is based on 
he idea that they should be ensured a higher level of protec- 
ion than ‘the average consumer’ referred to in Article 5(2).87 
owever, the understanding of vulnerability in the UCPD is a 
atter of vivid discussion. For example, a report of the Euro- 
ean Commission in 2016 confirmed the gradual nature of vul- 
erability,88 in particular highlighting that the notion of vul- 
erable consumers should be assessed on several elements,
as a result of socio-demographic characteristics, behavioural 
haracteristics, personal situation or market environment”.89 
dditionally, the Study has also argued that consumer vulner- 
bility is “multi-dimensional”90 and so is “the impact of per- 
onal characteristics on the likelihood of being vulnerable as 
 consumer”. For example, “characteristics like age and gen- 
er can increase vulnerability in some dimensions, but not 
n others”.91 The discussion about vulnerability in the UCPD 
lso stresses the limitations about the division between “av- 
rage” and “vulnerable” consumers and focus on temporal,
radual and contextual-relational aspects.92 Interestingly, the 
uropean Commission has also recently relayed on the grad- 
al approach to vulnerability in the Guidelines for the General 
roduct Safety Directive.93 
.2.2. Vulnerable research subjects in the EU law 
 second important legal field that generates a substantial 
iscussion about human vulnerability is the regulation of 87 European Commission, Staff Working Document Guidance on 
he implementation/application of directive 2005/29/EC on Unfair 
ommercial Practices accompanying the Document Communica- 
ion from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Coun- 
il, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Com- 
ittee of the Regions – A comprehensive approach to stimulating 
ross-border e-Commerce for Europe’s citizens and businesses, 
WD/2016/0163 final, § 2.6. 
88 European Commission, Consumer vulnerability across key markets 
n the European Union, Final report, January 2016, https://ec.europa. 
u/info/sites/info/files/consumers-approved-report _ en.pdf. 
89 Ibidem. 
90 Stacey Menzel Baker, James W Gentry and Terri L Rittenburg, 
Building Understanding of the Domain of Consumer Vulnerabil- 
ty’: [2005] Journal of Macromarketing 128, 134–135. 
91 Ibidem. 
92 European Parliament resolution of 22 May 2012 on a strategy for 
trengthening the rights of vulnerable consumers (2011/2272(INI)), 
1, Fred W. Morgan, Drue K. Schuler, and Jeffrey J. Stoltman, “A 
ramework for Examining the Legal Status of Vulnerable Con- 
umers,” Journal of Public Policy & Marketing 14, no. 2 (1995): 275. 
93 Commission Decision of 16 December 2009 laying down guide- 
ines for the management of the Community Rapid Information 
ystem RAPEX established under Article 12 and of the notifica- 
ion procedure established under Article 11 of Directive 2001/95/EC 
the General Product Safety Directive) (notified under document 
(2009) 9843) Table 1 . 
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iiomedical research. At the EU level, the Clinical Trials Reg- 
lation (CTR) of 2014 is one of the most interesting pieces of 
egislation dealing with this topic.94 
The CTR addresses the question of vulnerable research 
ubjects under different perspectives. Article 10, whose title is 
specific considerations for vulnerable populations”, requires 
hat for specific groups (minors, incapacitated subjects, preg- 
ant or breastfeeding women, or ‘other specific groups or sub- 
roups’) specific consideration shall be given to the assess- 
ent of the application for authorization 95 of a clinical trial.
his provision does not clarify whether this “specific consider- 
tion”should be dedicated to the decisional vulnerability of such 
esearch subjects (i.e. their higher difficulty in giving consent 
o their involvement in the research) 96 or to the higher risks of 
arms that these subjects might encounter during a medical 
esearch project.97 
Articles 31–33 address more specifically decisional vulner- 
bility. These articles dictate particular rules for obtaining 
ree consent from and giving adequate information to mi- 
ors (Article 31), incapacitated subjects (Article 32), pregnant 
r breastfeeding women (Article 33). Member States can even 
uarantee further protection for other subjects in a situa- 
ion of institutional or hierarchical dependency likely to influ- 
nce their freedom of consent (Article 34).98 In terms of deci- 
ional vulnerability, recital 31 mentions incidentally another 
ategory of vulnerable subjects that should require specific 
ttention when collecting informed consent: individuals be- 
onging to “an economically or socially disadvantaged group 
r in a situation of institutional or hierarchical dependency 
hat could inappropriately influence her or his decision to 
articipate”. 
A further reference to vulnerable people is at recital 15.
ere the notion of vulnerability does not refer to decisional 
ulnerability, but to the weaker health conditions of specific 
ategories of persons that the research should take into ac- 
ount. The reference to vulnerable groups at recital 15 aims 
o encourage specific medical research for vulnerable people,
n order to avoid underrepresentation of vulnerable groups.
n other words, this recital does not provide any particular 
afeguard or limitations for protecting vulnerable research 94 “Regulation (EU) No 536/2014 of the European Parliament and 
f the Council of 16 April 2014 on Clinical Trials on Medicinal Prod- 
cts for Human Use, and Repealing Directive 2001/20/EC Text with 
EA Relevance,” Pub. L. No. 32014R0536, 158 OJ L (2014). 
95 As regards authorization procedures that ethics committee 
hould follow for clinical trials see in particular Chapter II (Arti- 
les 5–9) of the Clinical Trials Regulation. 
96 Council of Europe, Convention for the protection of human 
ights and the dignity of human beings with regard to the appli- 
ation of biology and medicine. Oviedo: 1997; ETS no. 164. Coun- 
il of Europe. Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human 
ights and Biomedicine, concerning biomedical research. Stras- 
ourg 2005. CETS no. 195. 
97 Gennet, Andorno, and Elger, “Does the New EU Regulation 
n Clinical Trials Adequately Protect Vulnerable Research Partic- 
pants?,” 925–31. 
98 Namely: “persons performing mandatory military service, per- 
ons deprived of liberty, persons who, due to a judicial decision, 
annot take part in clinical trials, or persons in residential care 
nstitutions”. 
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 subjects: on the contrary, it encourages to involve more vul-
nerable individuals in research projects.99 
5. Beyond dichotomies: layers of vulnerability 
in the GDPR and the risk-based approach 
After this overview, we can argue that in the EU, there is no
single definition of vulnerable individuals. Although in sev-
eral sectors we observed specific lists of vulnerable subjects,
the general picture reveals a highly contextual and relational
understanding of vulnerability based on power imbalance (as
also the GDPR suggests). As regards the manifestation of vul-
nerability, although in the research field decisional vulnera-
bility plays an important role, other legal fields present strong
links between vulnerability and harms . Being vulnerable –
across different legal sectors – generally means being more
exposed to harms (if compared to other individuals) in some
particular contexts.100 
Connecting this analysis to the overview of vulnerabil-
ity theories ( Section 3 ), it seems to us that the EU legal ap-
proach to individual vulnerability can well fit with the layered-
vulnerability idea proposed by Luna.101 Her theory – based on
layers of vulnerability (i.e. universal vulnerability tempered by
an evaluation of different degrees of weakness) – can perhaps
well describe the relational and contextual notion of vulnera-
bility that we find in the EU law and in particular in the data
protection field. 
As we mentioned before, the notion of vulnerability is
present and central to the data protection law and practice, al-
though it is not adequately recognised yet. This results in lim-
ited capability of the data protection debate to acknowledge
inequalities and contextually framed situations of different
data subjects. We believe that implying vulnerability as one
of the interpretative frameworks could address those limits
and unleash the GDPR potential in responding to particularly
harmful practices that affect those in a disadvantaged posi-
tion. However, to do that, we need to overcome problematic
dichotomies present in vulnerability theory. As we mentioned
above, Luna’s layered theory might offer some preliminary so-
lutions. The theory of layered vulnerability 102 has had success
in the academic debate 103 because it may solve both the lim-
its of vulnerability as a label (source of stigmatisation) and the99 Gennet, Andorno, and Elger, “Does the New EU Regulation 
on Clinical Trials Adequately Protect Vulnerable Research Partic- 
ipants?,” 929. 
00 Peroni and Timmer, “Vulnerable Groups,” 1058 and 1064–67; 
Gennet, Andorno, and Elger, “Does the New EU Regulation on Clin- 
ical Trials Adequately Protect Vulnerable Research Participants?,”
926. 
01 Florencia Luna, ‘Elucidating the Concept of Vulnerability: Lay- 
ers Not Labels’ (2009) 2 International Journal of Feminist Ap- 
proaches to Bioethics 121; Florencia Luna, ‘Identifying and Evalu- 
ating Layers of Vulnerability – a Way Forward’ (2019) 19 Developing 
World Bioethics 86. 
02 See general: Luna, “Identifying and Evaluating Layers of Vul- 
nerability – a Way Forward”; and “Elucidating the Concept of Vul- 
nerability: Layers Not Labels”. 
03 Gennet, Andorno, and Elger, “Does the New EU Regulation 
on Clinical Trials Adequately Protect Vulnerable Research Partic- 
ipants?,” 926. 
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1limits of universal vulnerability (if everyone is vulnerable, the
notion will lose its usefulness in protecting weaker individ-
uals). Layered understanding of vulnerability can also bring
some certainty to the mitigation strategies and address some
confusion between harm-based and procedural approaches.
Luna in her recent article on layers of vulnerability tried to
operationalise the concept and propose a method to identify
and assess different layers of vulnerability. In particular, she
recommends assessing risks of vulnerability considering two
factors: the harmfulness of effects and the likelihood of risks.104 
5.1. The layered approach to vulnerability and the 
risk-based approach in the GDPR 
As noted by Gennet et al., Luna’s theory adopts a risk-based
definition of vulnerable persons. Interestingly, in the GDPR the
notion of risks to fundamental rights and freedoms is piv-
otal. In particular, according to the risk-based approach in the
GDPR (Article 24), the data controller is obliged to implement
appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure
the compliance with the data protection principles: “taking
into account the nature, scope, context and purposes of pro-
cessing as well as the risks of varying likelihood and severity for
the rights and freedoms of natural persons”.105 When assess-
ing such risks of varying likelihood and severity for rights and
freedoms, the controller should of course consider situations
in which a certain data processing could damage more some
particular (vulnerable) individuals. 
Indeed, vulnerable persons are often defined as persons
at higher risks (in terms of likelihood and severity) of dam-
ages to their rights and freedoms.106 The notion of severity
and likelihood seems perfectly in line with the two criteria for
evaluating vulnerability layers in Luna’s theory (harmfulness
of effects and likelihood). Therefore, the risk-based approach
can play a significant role in recognising and conceptualising
the variety of risks (and layers) that can amplify, expose and
exploit different vulnerabilities. Furthermore, it helps extend
the scope of the GDPR to problems that are not traditionally
related to the data protection discourse, like discrimination
or inequality. This aspect of the risk-based approach plays, a
significant role in mitigating potentially harmful outcomes of
data-driven technologies. 
Also, according to the principle of data protection by design
(Article 25), the controller shall, both at the time of the deter-
mination of the means for processing and at the time of the
processing itself, implement appropriate technical and organ-
isational measures, which are designed to implement data-
protection principles. Even in this case the controller should
take into account “the nature, scope, context and purposes of
processing as well as the risks of varying likelihood and sever-
ity for rights and freedoms of natural persons”, but also “the
state of the art [and] the cost of implementation”. 
The difference between Article 24 and Article 25 is that in
the first case the data controller should merely prove his or her04 Luna, “Elucidating the Concept of Vulnerability: Layers Not La- 
bels,” 89. 
05 Emphasis added. 
06 Luna, “Identifying and Evaluating Layers of Vulnerability – a 
Way Forward,” 86–95. 
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oompliance with the data protection principles. In the latter 
e or she should also “implement” data-protection principles 
according to what is proportional to the state of the art and 
he costs of implementation).107 In both cases, the attention 
o vulnerable data subjects and the implementation of specific 
afeguards to protect their rights and freedoms (i.e. to mitigate 
actors of vulnerability) seems necessary. 
One further protection for vulnerable data subjects is the 
ata Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA). As already ex- 
lained above, Article 35 (as interpreted by recital 75 and by 
P29) requires performing a DPIA in case of high-risk data 
rocessing, including the case where the data subjects can be 
onsidered vulnerable. The DPIA is based on several steps (Ar- 
icle 35(7)): the systematic description of the processing, the 
ssessment of necessity and proportionality, the assessment 
f risks and the description of measures envisaged to mitigate 
uch risks. In other words, even according to the accountabil- 
ty principle, it is the controller who should autonomously de- 
ermine measures for protecting vulnerable individuals. 
It is clear that each measure should be linked to a risk.
e have often referred to vulnerable subjects under different 
isk factors: in particular, decisional vulnerability and risks of 
ore significant harms. Data controllers may suggest mitiga- 
ion measures for particular vulnerable groups: e.g., in case of 
ecisional vulnerability, the data controller could implement 
pecific forms of consent or information disclosure measures; 
n case of individuals that might be easily discriminated, the 
ata controller could implement periodical audits against dis- 
rimination, etc. 
In addition, the DPIA can also overcome tensions between 
he notion of vulnerability as a risk within the processing and 
he notion of vulnerability as an outcome of the data process- 
ng. The holistic approach of Article 35 requires to analyse 
isks broadly, and also to systematically describe the data pro- 
essing and assessing its necessity and proportionality. 
We observe that such rules might appear as blank pro- 
isions, conditional to the will and activity of the data con- 
roller.108 However, some tools could reduce arbitrariness of 
ata controllers: e.g., codes of conduct could better specify 
hat to do in case of vulnerable data subjects, in specific sec- 
ors ; 109 certification mechanism could also help.110 Also, the 
ata Protection Authorities (DPAs) (e.g. through their powers,
ccording to – inter alia – Article 36 about prior notifications) 
ould release clear guidelines on how to deal with some vul- 
erable individuals.111 
.2. Legal bases for processing data of vulnerable subjects 
he layered-based notion of vulnerability and the risk-based 
pproach can be a key also for addressing the issue of deci- 07 Lina Jasmontaite and others, ‘Data Protection by Design and by 
efault’: (2018) 4 European Data Protection Law Review 168. 
08 See, e.g., Ann Cavoukian, Alexander Dix and Khaled El 
mam, ‘The Unintended Consequences of Privacy Paternalism’ 
Information and Privacy Commissioner, Ontario, Canada), 7–8 
 https://collections.ola.org/mon/28003/326077.pdf > . 
09 See Articles 40–41 of the GDPR. 
10 See Article 42 of the GDPR. 
11 See Section 5.f. 
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a
nional vulnerability: is consent an adequate legal basis for vul- 
erable individuals? If yes, should consent be accompanied by 
ore tailored information? If not, are there better legal bases 
or processing vulnerable persons’ data or the data controller 
hould avoid processing those data? 
According to Article 24, the data controller needs to anal- 
se the level of risk (for fundamental rights and freedoms of 
ata subjects) and so the level of vulnerability of the data sub- 
ect before proceeding with the data processing. Accordingly,
hen choosing the legal basis for data processing (consent, le- 
itimate interests), it is necessary to do a vulnerability layers- 
valuation of the data subjects and adapt the safeguards. 
As mentioned above, the only vulnerable category that has 
roup-specific protection under the GDPR is the category of 
hildren. Their specific protection is mostly based on two el- 
ments: consent and information duties of data controllers.
hen data processing is based on consent and relates to the 
ffer of information society services, under a certain age (16 
ears, that Member States can reduce to 13) consent should 
e given or authorised by the holder of parental responsibility 
or the child (Article 8). At the same time, transparency du- 
ies and any communication within the exercise of data pro- 
ection rights, should be “in a concise transparent, intelligible 
nd easily accessible form, using clear and plain language, in 
articular for any information addressed specifically to a child ”112 
Article 12(1)). 
One might wonder whether, by analogy, these safeguards 
ould also be used for other (adult) vulnerable data subjects.
nterestingly, the WP29 guidelines on consent, when referring 
o the child’s consent in Article 8, affirm: “[c]ompared to the 
urrent directive, the GDPR creates an additional layer of pro- 
ection where personal data of vulnerable natural persons, espe- 
ially children, are processed ”.113 This sentence seems to sug- 
est that special rules for consent were conceived for all vul- 
erable natural persons: “especially children” does not mean 
only children”. However, parental consent for information so- 
iety services is a special rule that cannot be easily applied in 
ifferent contexts. The only similarity with some “vulnerable 
dults” is that legally incapacitated persons might need con- 
ent (or authorisation to consent) from their legal representa- 
ives, according to the national laws.114 In more general terms,
e could assume that data controllers should adopt special 
afeguards when collecting consent from vulnerable adults . 
This is in line with the characteristics of consent under Ar- 
icles 4(11) and 7: freely given, specific, informed and unam- 
iguous. Consent is free only if the data subject is capable of 
hoosing whether to give consent and controlling how to give 
nd withdraw it.115 In particular, WP29 adds: “any element 
f inappropriate pressure or influence upon the data subject 12 Emphasis added. 
13 Article 29 Working Party, Guidelines on Consent under Regula- 
ion 2016/679, WP 259 rev.01, 23. Emphasis added. 
14 Article 8(3) GDPR clarifies that special rules for child’s consent 
shall not affect the general contract law of Member States such 
s the rules on the validity, formation or effect of a contract in 
elation to a child”. 
15 Article 29 Working Party, Guidelines on Consent, 5: “The ele- 
ent “free” implies real choice and control for data subjects. As 
 general rule, the GDPR prescribes that if the data subject has 
o real choice, feels compelled to consent or will endure nega- 
computer law & security review 37 (2020) 105415 13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
highly sensitive information should, in principle, be permitted 
only with the consent of the data subject”. 
123 About the notion of legibility see Richard Mortier et al., 
“Human-Data Interaction: The Human Face of the Data-Driven (which may be manifested in many different ways) which pre-
vents a data subject from exercising [her] free will, shall render
the consent invalid”.116 In other words, when the data subject
is in a situation of decisional vulnerability, consent should not
be valid. 
Recital 43 relates the idea of freedom of consent to the no-
tion of power imbalance: “in order to ensure that consent is
freely given, consent should not provide a valid legal ground
for the processing of personal data in a specific case where
there is a clear imbalance between the data subject and the con-
troller , in particular where the controller is a public authority”.
We already observed how individual vulnerability is defined,
especially in the data protection field, as power imbalance be-
tween controllers and subjects.117 WP29 explains that imbal-
ances of power are not limited to public authorities but also
include the relationship between employees and employers
and even other situations: “[c]onsent can only be valid if the
data subject is able to exercise a real choice, and there is no
risk of deception, intimidation, coercion or significant nega-
tive consequences (e.g. substantial extra costs) if he/she does
not consent. Consent will not be free in cases where there is
any element of compulsion, pressure or inability to exercise
free will”.118 In other words, consent should not be a legal ba-
sis when the data subject can be in a situation of decisional
vulnerability. The EDPB Opinion on Clinical Trials Regulation
also highlights that consent should not be a legal basis for
data processing in case of vulnerable data subjects. In partic-
ular when the potential subject is not “in good health con-
ditions” or “belongs to an economically or socially disadvan-
taged group, or is in a situation of institutional or hierarchi-
cal dependency that could inappropriately influence her or his
decision to participate”.119 
However, we remark that consent should be avoided not in
all cases of vulnerable data subjects, but only when the data
subjects are affected by decisional vulnerability.120 In other
cases, consent is not only possible but even recommended:
this is why WP29 Guidelines on Purpose Limitation affirm that
further processing of data (the so-called repurposing of data
processing) for vulnerable data subjects should be possible
just upon consent.121 In that context, the notion of vulnerable
individuals seems associated with the risk of, e.g., discrimina-
tion, rather than to situations of decisional vulnerability.122 tive consequences if they do not consent, then consent will not 
be valid”. 
16 Article 29 Working Party, Guidelines on Consent, 6. 
17 Article 29 Working Party, Guidelines on DPIA, 10: “Vulnerable 
data subjects may include […] any case where an imbalance in 
the relationship between the position of the data subject and the 
controller can be identified”. 
18 Article 29 Working Party, Guidelines on Consent, 7. 
19 European Data Protection Board, Opinion 3/2019 concerning 
the Questions and Answers on the interplay between the Clinical 
Trials Regulation (CTR) and the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) (art.70.1.b), 6, 
20 About the distinction between decisional vulnerability and 
other forms of vulnerability see Section 5(a). 
21 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 03/2013 on purpose limita- 
tion, 32. 
22 Ibidem, 32: “further processing of personal data concerning 
health, data about children, other vulnerable individuals, or other 
1
1
1However, in a few cases, the decisional vulnerability can be
mitigated with the adoption of better safeguards, in particu-
lar transparency safeguards. As we observed, Article 12 seems
to require a very high standard of legibility for information
policies and for other communications within the exercise of
data protection rights.123 If such communication is addressed
to persons with reduced understanding (including – but not
limited to – children), data controllers might be required to
give information in a way that might be easily understandable
by every recipient. Also, WP29 Guidelines on Transparency re-
fer to other vulnerable positions: “if a data controller is aware
that their goods/services are availed of by (or targeted at) other
vulnerable members of society, including people with disabil-
ities or people who may have difficulties accessing informa-
tion, the vulnerabilities of such data subjects should be taken
into account by the data controller in its assessment of how
to ensure that it complies with its transparency obligations in
relation to such data subjects”.124 
5.3. Participation of vulnerable data subjects in the 
decision-making about data processing 
The layered approach to data subjects’ vulnerability also re-
quires mitigation strategies that are adequate to the partic-
ular context and situations. We explore some of the possi-
ble directions toward interpreting existing mechanism within
the GDPR that could adequately react to vulnerability of cer-
tain groups. Those ideas include, for example, procedural safe-
guards related to participation or institutional responses. 
Some authors have suggested involving individuals in the
decision-making about research.125 The participatory prin-
ciple is also part of a long discussion within the human-
computer interaction field in the context of designing tech-
nologies.126 
If the participatory process is meaningful it can highlight
and respond to experiences and situation of vulnerable com-Society,” ArXiv:1412.6159 [Cs] , October 6, 2014, http://arxiv.org/ 
abs/1412.6159 ; Gianclaudio Malgieri and Giovanni Comandé, 
“Sensitive-by-Distance: Quasi-Health Data in the Algorithmic Era,”
Information & Communications Technology Law 26, no. 3 (2017): 229–49, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13600834.2017.1335468 ; Gianclaudio Mal- 
gieri and Giovanni Comandé, “Why a Right to Legibility of Au- 
tomated Decision-Making Exists in the General Data Protection 
Regulation,” International Data Privacy Law 7, no. 4 (2017): 243–65, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/idpl/ipx019 . 
24 Article 29 Working Party, Guidelines on Transparency, 9. 
25 See, e.g., Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis- 
crimination against Women, General Recommendation 30 , para. 57. 
See also: Veronika Flegar and Emma Iedema, “The Use of the ‘Vul- 
nerability’ Label by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrim- 
ination Against Women: Protecting or Stigmatizing Women and 
Girls in the Forced Migration Context?”, Brill Open Law , (2019): 27, 
https://doi.org/10.1163/23527072-20191021 . 
26 Sasha Costanza-Chock, “Design Justice: Towards an Intersec- 
tional Feminist Framework for Design Theory and Practice” (De- 
sign Research Society Conference, Limerick, 2018), 10, https://doi. 
org/10.21606/drs.2018.679 . 
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134 Julia Powles, “The Seductive Diversion of ‘Solving’ Bias 
in Artificial Intelligence,” 2018, https://medium.com/s/story/ 
the-seductive-diversion-of-solving-bias-in-artificial-intelligence- 
890df5e5ef53 . 
135 Similarly, also the principle of legitimacy of purposes (Article 
5(1) point b) could serve as a barrier against the exploitation of 
vulnerable data subjects. 
136 See the centrality of the notion of fairness in the vulnerability unities.127 In the context of Big Data research, Jackson et al.
rgue that the engagement of vulnerable groups in research 
s participants but also contributors to study design, imple- 
entation, and the analysis can help address problem of dis- 
riminatory biases.128 However participation in research and 
ecision-making about data-driven technologies should also 
ulfil certain conditions. One example of such participatory- 
riven design process is the “Design Justice” project.129 It rec- 
mmends engaging with the questions about power, distribu- 
ion of risks and benefits, reproduction of domination and op- 
ression as well as creating a space for the more equitable and 
air design process. The data protection field can use those 
nsights to understand the role of participatory process in 
ecision-making about data-driven technologies and their im- 
act on fundamental rights. 
Interestingly, the DPIA under the GDPR already provides 
ome forms of participation of the data subjects. In partic- 
lar, Article 35(9) states as follows: “where appropriate, the 
ontroller shall seek the views of data subjects or their rep- 
esentatives on the intended processing, without prejudice to 
he protection of commercial or public interests or the secu- 
ity of processing operations”. Although the involvement of 
ata subjects is required only when “appropriate”,130 the DPIA 
uidelines envision that this input could be, for example, in 
he form of surveys crafted by data controllers and sent to 
uture customers. Also, those Guidelines explain that if data 
ontrollers do not seek these external views, they must jus- 
ify such decision.131 In addition, if data controllers do seek 
hese views and then disregard them, they must document 
hy they have chosen to disregard external inputs.132 
.4. Data protection as backstop for high-risk data 
rocessing 
n some cases, the vulnerable condition of the data subjects 
s so relevant that the data controllers could find no adequate 
afeguards to mitigate them: in these situations, the only way 
s not to start (or not to continue) the data processing.133 Sev- 27 Haiyi Zhu et al., “Value-Sensitive Algorithm Design: Method, 
ase Study, and Lessons”, Proceedings of the ACM on Human- 
omputer Interaction 2, no. CSCW (2018): 1–23, https://doi.org/10. 
145/3274463 . 
28 Latifa Jackson et al., “Including Vulnerable Populations in the 
ssessment of Data From Vulnerable Populations,” Frontiers in Big 
ata 2 (June 28, 2019): 7, https://doi.org/10.3389/fdata.2019.00019 . 
29 Costanza-Chock, “ Design Justice,” 2. 
30 In the original proposal of the Commission, consultation with 
ata subjects was mandatory (Article 33[4]). The Parliament’s text 
rgued that this ‘represents a disproportionate burden on data 
ontrollers’ (amendment 262). Accordingly, the approved Article 
5(9) requires consultation only ‘where appropriate’ and ‘with- 
ut prejudice to the protection of commercial or public interests 
r the security of the processing operations’’. See also: Reuben 
inns, “Data Protection Impact Assessments: A Meta-Regulatory 
pproach”, International Data Privacy Law 7, no. 1 (2017): 28, https: 
/doi.org/10.1093/idpl/ipw027 . 
31 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines on Data 
rotection Impact Assessment (DPIA), 15. 
32 Ibidem, 15. 
33 See, e.g., European Data Protection Board, Letter in reply to So- 
hie In’t Veld, Ref: OUT2020-0004, 29 January 2020, 4. 
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vral scholars have indeed recently suggested that what is nec- 
ssary is not only to mitigate risks of certain data processing 
ut to avoid some kinds of data processing from the outset. For 
xample, discussing AI systems and their possible discrim- 
natory outcomes, Powles argues that instead of solving the 
roblem of biases we need to wonder if particularly harmful 
ata-driven systems should be used in the first place.134 
In general terms, the mere application of the data protec- 
ion principles at Article 5 could lead to avoiding certain data 
rocessing. In particular, the principle of fairness (Article 5(1),
oint a),135 could serve as a barrier against data processing 
xploiting vulnerable data subjects.136 Several authors have 
uggested that its goal is to mitigate excessive unfair imbal- 
nces between controllers and data subjects on a case-by-case 
asis. The natural consequence of such principle is that the 
ata controller should avoid exploiting data subjects’ factors 
f vulnerability.137 In some cases, this may not be possible 
ust through the implementation of suitable safeguards as re- 
uired at Articles 24, 25 and 35: there might be no safeguards 
o rebalance the asymmetry between data controllers and vul- 
erable data subjects.138 
Another principle that could act as a backstop against the 
xploitation of vulnerable data subject is the principle of law- 
ulness (Article 5(1), point a): in some cases, there might be no 
dequate legal bases to process data of vulnerable data sub- 
ects. We already observed above that consent is not always 
n adequate legal basis, in particular in case of decisional vul- 
erability of data subjects. In those cases, the data controller iscourse: Florencia Luna, “Elucidating the Concept of Vulnerabil- 
ty: Layers Not Labels,” International Journal of Feminist Approaches to 
ioethics 2, no. 1 (2009): 126. 
37 Damian Clifford and Jef Ausloos, “Data Protection and the 
ole of Fairness”, Yearbook of European Law 37 (2018): 130, https:// 
oi.org/10.1093/yel/yey004 ; Inge Graef, Damian Clifford and Peggy 
alcke, “Fairness and Enforcement: Bridging Competition, Data 
rotection, and Consumer Law," International Data Privacy Law 
 (2018): 200, https://doi.org/10.1093/idpl/ipy013 ; Michael Butter- 
orth, “The ICO and Artificial Intelligence: The Role of Fair- 
ess in the GDPR Framework,” Computer Law & Security Review 
4 (2018): 257, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.clsr.2018.01.004 ; Gianclau- 
io Malgieri, “The Concept of Fairness in the GDPR: A Linguistic 
nd Contextual Interpretation”, Proceedings of the 2020 Conference 
n Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (Association for Com- 
uting Machinery 2020), https://doi.org/10.1145/3351095.3372868 . 
38 This might be the case of researches, whose research goal is 
xplicitly based on the exploitation of vulnerable situations (e.g. 
nderstanding sexual orientation of people in specific countries 
here homosexuality is criminalized, etc.). Or cases where any 
afeguards might be useless: see Luna, 2019, 94, making the ex- 
mple of fertile women in countries where abortion is illegal who 
ill not be able to adhere to and use birth control measures ow- 
ng to their partners’ refusal or because it may lead to intra-family 
iolence, etc. 
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141 About the idea of cooperation between single data controllers 
(that need to implement the accountability principle) and public 
supervisory entities see Margot E. Kaminski, “Binary Governance: 
Lessons from the GDPR’s Approach to Algorithmic Accountability,”
Southern California Law Review 92, no. 6 (2019), https://papers.ssrn. should choose another legal basis under article 6.139 If it is not
possible to process data on the basis of contract, legal obli-
gation, public interest and vital interests, the data controller
might consider processing data on the basis of legitimate in-
terest (Article 6(1) point f). However, even in that case, she is
asked to assess the balancing between her interests and the
data subject’s ones. In such assessment, WP29 suggests con-
sidering, inter alia, “the status of the data controller and data
subject, including the balance of power between the data sub-
ject and the data controller, or whether the data subject is a
child or otherwise belongs to a more vulnerable segment of
the population. (…) It is important to assess the effect of ac-
tual processing on particular individuals”.140 In other words,
it might be the case that considering the particular effects of
a data processing, the right to privacy and data protection of
vulnerable data subjects prevails on the legitimate interest of
the data controller: in this case the data processing should not
start at all. 
In addition, Article 36 (as interpreted through recital 94) de-
scribes when data controller needs to consult the DPA before
the processing activities. Such prior consultation is necessary
if the DPIA reveals that the processing would result (in the
absence of safeguards, security measures and mechanisms
to mitigate the risk) in high risks to the rights and freedoms
of natural persons and the controller is of the opinion that
the risk cannot be mitigated by reasonable means in terms of
available technologies and costs of implementation. 
Interestingly, recital 94 explains that these cases of high
risks are “likely to result from certain types of processing and
the extent and frequency of processing, which may also result
in a realization of damage or interference with the rights and
freedoms of the natural person”. In other words, there might
be cases of higher risks of damages (i.e. cases of vulnerable indi-
viduals as explained above) that cannot be mitigated through
particular measures. 
Once consulted, the DPA could give specific indications
about safeguards to adopt in the particular situations, but may
also “use any of its powers referred to in Article 58” (Article
36(2)), including the power to impose a temporary or defini-
tive limitation including a ban on processing (Article 58(2),
point f). In other words, if the risk assessment (the “vulner-
ability layers” assessment) reveals high risks that could not be
mitigated through reasonable efforts, a system of cooperative
governance between controllers and DPAs could take place.
However the DPAs could even prohibit certain data processing
where specific forms of vulnerability of certain data subjects
cannot be rebalanced. 39 About the limits of consent see in general Gabriella Fortuna- 
Zanfir, “Forgetting about Consent. Why the Focus Should Be on 
‘Suitable Safeguards’ in Data Protection Law,” in Reloading Data Pro- 
tection , ed. Serge Gutwirth, Ronald Leenes, Paul De Hert (Springer, 
2014), 237–55; Bart W. Schermer, Bart Custers, and Simone van 
der Hof, “The Crisis of Consent: How Stronger Legal Protection 
May Lead to Weaker Consent in Data Protection,” Ethics and Infor- 
mation Technology 16, no. 2 (2014): 171–82, https://doi.org/10.1007/ 
s10676- 014- 9343- 8 ; Bart Custers et al., “Consent and Privacy,” in 
The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Consent , ed. Andreas Müller 
and Peter Schaber (London: Routledge, 2019). 
40 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion on purpose limitation, 51. 
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15.5. Data protection agencies as a responsive authority 
The notion of vulnerability can also play a role in the op-
erations of DPAs.141 Theoreticians in the vulnerability field
call for institutional responses to certain dependencies, in-
equalities or capabilities of specific groups.142 Such a way
of looking at DPAs is mentioned just once in the GDPR.
Under Article 57, DPAs should conduct specific activities,
including raising public awareness about data protection
(point b). When carrying out this task, DPAs should pay
special attention to addressing the situation of children.
This approach is consistent with other provisions that con-
struct a special position of children in the GDPR. Indeed,
some national DPAs already took actions toward promot-
ing knowledge about data protection in schools or try to
come with particular guidelines addressing the situation of
children.143 
However, the question remains if and how vulnerability
can act as a paradigm in conducting other activities, espe-
cially those that have a substantial aspect like handling com-
plaints, carrying inspections or imposing fines. Another as-
pect to consider is the risk limitations of access to authori-
ties and obstacles in receiving redress when data rights are
violated. As the Fundamental Rights Agency emphasised, in-
dividuals belonging to vulnerable groups may face structural
problems, like lack of financial resources, inadequate level of
legal literacy and empowerment in exercising access to jus-
tice in general.144 Similar problems can be experienced in the
data protection field.145 That is why there might be a partic-
ular responsibility of DPAs (and broader national legal sys-
tems) to ensure that they take necessary steps to grant peo-
ple belonging to such vulnerable groups access to redress
mechanisms. 
As it was already mentioned, DPAs may also use their
powers under the mechanism of a priori consultation, when
processing of personal data would result in a high risk to
the fundamental rights and freedoms (Article 36 and 58(3),
point a). In such a situation, DPAs may issue recommenda-
tions and guidelines if the processing is related to vulnera-
ble individuals. DPAs’ power related to guidance, consultation,
and opinions can be enforced vis-à-vis national legislationscom/abstract=3351404 . 
42 Fineman, “The Vulnerable Subject,” 8–10. 
43 For example: Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos, „Memoria 2016”, 2107, https://www.aepd.es/media/ 
memorias/memoria- AEPD- 2016.pdf; Information Com- 
missioner’s Offices, “Age appropriate design: a code 
of practice for online services”, 2016 https://ico.org. 
uk/about- the- ico/ico- and- stakeholder- consultations/ 
age-appropriate-design-a-code-of-practice-for-online-services/ 
44 Fundamental Rights Agency, Handbook on European Law Re- 
lating to Access to Justice (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the 
European Union, 2016). 
45 Fundamental Rights Agency, “Access to Data Protection Reme- 
dies in the EU Member States” (Luxembourg: Publications Office of 
the European Union, 2013). 
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pnd code of conducts (see Article 58). In all those instances,
PAs may take into account situations of vulnerable individ- 
als and specify how processing of personal data could be 
erformed. 
. Concluding thoughts 
he vulnerability-aware interpretation of data protection law 
ay provide a meaningful response to many shortcomings 
f the existing discourse and practices around the data pro- 
ection rights. Firstly, contrarily to other fields, like consumer 
rotection, the data protection discourse has never really de- 
eloped the notion of the data subject and the possible lay- 
rs of data subjects in terms of awareness, understanding and 
eakness (e.g., the “average data subject” versus the “vulnera- 
le data subjects). Secondly, privacy and data protection have 
 potential to be understood as a framework that allows re- 
alancing situations of individual vulnerability (see, in partic- 
lar, Calo’s theory of privacy and vulnerability).146 Thirdly, the 
ise of data-driven technologies that may serve as tools for ex- 
loitation, manipulation, and discrimination of marginalised 
ommunities and individuals in particular life situations re- 
uire a robust and effective use of existing legal instruments 
hat could mitigate individual and collective harms. 
Here we propose to focus on the important role for the no- 
ion of vulnerability as a principle that is coherent with the 
ata protection values and legal constructions. Indeed, vul- 
erability can be seen as one of the driving forces in data 
rotection, which is related to the recognition of inferiority,
ependency, and subjugation of individuals in the context of 
rocessing data. Although this relation was rarely stressed 
nd explained explicitly. We also believe that vulnerability can 
elp identify and address situations of individuals and groups,
hich require specific protection.147 The recognition of the 
articular vulnerability of some data subjects can be trans- 
ated into tailored safeguards or institutional interventions 
hat take into account the vulnerable position of data sub- 
ects. This is also a way to introduce some additional “duties 
f cares” to the operation of data controllers and DPAs.148 It 
an also have important implications for addressing problems 
f automated discrimination and manipulation. Seen through 
he lenses of vulnerability, responses to algorithmically medi- 
ted discrimination or manipulation move beyond the narrow 
nterventions that focus on transparency or explainability and 46 Calo,“Privacy, Vulnerability, and Affordance”, 15. 
47 Similar argument in bioethics field in Wendy Rogers, Catriona 
ackenzie, and Susan Dodds, “Why Bioethics Needs a Concept of 
ulnerability,” 11–38. 
48 Peter Blume, “The Data Subject,” 259; Jack M. Balkin, “Fixing 
ocial Media’s Grand Bargain,” Hoover Working Group on National 
ecurity, Technology, and Law, Aegis Series Paper No. 1814 (2018) : 
2, https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/ 
alkin _ webreadypdf.pdf. ry to offer a more holistic approach that use the whole sys- 
em of the GDPR in understanding, minimising and mitigating 
otentially harmful positions of data subjects. 
However, the data subjects’ vulnerability is involved in 
roblematic dichotomies (universalistic versus particular ap- 
roach and vulnerability within the data processing versus 
ulnerability related to the outcome of the data processing).
o overcome some of the problems that emerge from these 
ichotomies, we turn to Luna’s theory of layered vulnerability.
e believe it might present the most suitable approach to the 
omplex relation between data-driven technologies and fun- 
amental rights (and, in particular, the right to data protec- 
ion). Our vulnerability-aware interpretation follows this the- 
ry and argues for using the open clauses in the GDPR to pro-
ide adequate protection to vulnerable data subjects. Indeed,
he notion of risks for fundamental rights in the GDPR is in 
ine with the idea of vulnerability as higher risks of harms 
or some individuals. Accordingly, the data protection by de- 
ign and the DPIA could be tools to implement specific safe- 
uards for vulnerable individuals. Other data protection prin- 
iples and rules (the concept of fairness, transparency duties,
he concept of lawfulness and the role of consent, the role of 
PAs and the broader participation of data-subjects in deci- 
ion making about data processing) can also play a similarly 
mportant role in framing the protection of vulnerable data 
ubjects. 
Altogether we see vulnerability as a powerful interpretative 
nd narrative tool that could bring responsiveness and duty 
f care to the data protection field. However, further reflec- 
ion and conceptualisation is still required. Many of the prob- 
ems described in this article have been only hinted, and we 
ope to explore them in further works, in particular the rela- 
ionship between the layered conception of vulnerability and 
isk assessment, the impact of different manifestations vul- 
erabilities in exercising data protection rights and the role of 
PAs. 
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